By Shishir Prashant 
PrashantNews
Thirteen years after the devastating Kedarnath disaster, questions over the use of advance weather warnings by government agencies in Uttarakhand have resurfaced following two mountain tragedies within 48 hours, raising concerns about whether meteorological forecasts are being adequately factored into decisions concerning trekking and helicopter operations.
On October 29, a group of trekkers from West Bengal and Uttar Pradesh, along with their local support staff, were caught in an avalanche and heavy snowfall during the Kedartal trek in Uttarkashi district. A day later, on October 30, a helicopter operated by Trans Bharat Aviation crashed near Joshimath in Chamoli district, crashed killing all six people on board, including the pilot.
In both cases, the India Meteorological Department (IMD) had issued weather warnings ahead of the incidents.
In the Kedartal case, a yellow weather alert had been issued for the hilly areas of Uttarakhand, warning of adverse weather conditions on October 29. However, the trekking party had been granted permission by the Forest Department on October 26 and entered the trekking route the next day.
Gangotri National Park officials claimed that the department received a weather alert concerning October 29 very late by which time the group had already left. Officials could not contact the trekkers to convey the warning.
The incident raises questions about whether there is an effective mechanism to communicate fresh weather advisories to trekking parties already operating in remote Himalayan areas and whether authorities have the power and preparedness to suspend or restrict such expeditions when adverse weather is forecast.
The helicopter crash in Chamoli district raises a separate but equally serious question about the assessment of weather conditions before flights are permitted in mountainous terrain.
For October 30, the IMD had issued an orange alert for Chamoli district, forecasting thunderstorms accompanied by lightning, hail and gusty winds in isolated areas.
Despite the warning, the Trans Bharat Aviation helicopter took off from Badrinath at 1.14 pm for Sahastradhara helipad in Dehradun with five passengers and a pilot on board. It crashed in a forested area near Chai village in Joshimath.
The precise cause of the crash remains under investigation by aviation authorities. While the district administration’s initial report attributed the accident to adverse weather conditions, investigators are also examining other possible factors. An orange alert by itself does not constitute a flight prohibition, but the circumstances raise questions about the weather assessment and operational decisions preceding the take-off.
The controversy over the use of weather warnings is not new in Uttarakhand. It had surfaced prominently after the devastating Kedarnath disaster of June 16-17, 2013, when unprecedented rainfall, flash floods and the breach of the Chorabari Lake triggered massive destruction in the Mandakini valley.
The Uttarakhand Meteorological Centre had maintained that it issued timely warnings of heavy to very heavy rainfall ahead of the disaster.
According to the National Institute of Disaster Management’s report on the 2013 Uttarakhand disaster, the IMD’s Dehradun centre, along with its regional and national forecasting centres, issued alerts on June 15 warning of heavy rainfall over the next 48-72 hours. In December 2013, the Government told the Rajya Sabha that there had been no failure on the part of the IMD in issuing severe weather warnings.
The government also acknowledged that continuous rainfall and snowmelt had contributed to the rise in water levels in Chorabari Lake, whose weak moraine barrier eventually gave way.
The 2013 disaster had prompted questions about whether the warnings were translated into adequate preventive action on the ground. More than a decade later, the recent incidents have brought back similar concerns.
The latest incidents raise several questions for the state government and its agencies. Does Uttarakhand have a standard operating procedure (SOP) under which trekking permissions are reviewed or suspended following adverse weather warnings? Are Forest Department officials required to communicate fresh alerts to trekking parties already on the route?
Similarly, is there a mandatory mechanism for aviation operators and the authorities concerned to assess district-level weather alerts before helicopter operations in high-altitude areas?
The IMD provides weather forecasts and warnings, but their effectiveness ultimately depends on how promptly and seriously the concerned agencies act on them.
With Uttarakhand increasingly exposed to extreme weather events, avalanches, landslides and sudden changes in mountain conditions, the need for better coordination between the Meteorological Department, Forest Department, district administrations, disaster management authorities and aviation regulators has become critical.
The larger question is whether the lessons of the 2013 Kedarnath disaster have translated into an effective system of preventive action, or whether weather warnings continue to remain largely advisory documents rather than triggers for timely decisions on the ground.
When contacted for his comments, Met Director Dr C S Tomar said it would not be appropriate for him to comment on the matter as investigations into the incidents were underway.