By Shishir Prashant 
PrashantNews
Abdul Qadeer Khan, the Pakistani nuclear scientist often called the father of the bomb, led an extensive clandestine network that sold nuclear technology and know-how to several countries, including Iran.
Investigations by intelligence agencies and multiple reports have shown that Khan’s network illicitly transferred centrifuge designs, components and technical assistance that helped Iran advance its uranium enrichment capabilities.
Much before the Iran war began, the nuclear programme has been among the most contentious issues in global politics over the last 2-3 decades, shaping relations between Tehran, Western powers, and regional actors. At its core, the debate revolves around whether Iran’s nuclear activities are genuinely peaceful or whether they hide ambitions to develop nuclear weapons capability.
Iran’s nuclear efforts began under the Shah regime with U.S. support, aiming to develop civilian nuclear technology for electricity and research. The country joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968 and accepted safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Iran ratified the treaty two years later. However, suspicions grew in later decades that Tehran might be pursuing weapons-related technology, especially given its history of clandestine facilities and limited transparency.
Tensions peaked in the early 2000s when Western intelligence and the IAEA reported evidence of previously undeclared nuclear activities that could be linked to weaponisation. This led to years of strained diplomacy, sanctions, and intermittent negotiations. In response, Iran insisted its ambitions were peaceful, claiming its nuclear programme was aimed at energy generation, medical research, and technological advancement.
A breakthrough came in 2015 with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—commonly known as the Iran nuclear deal. Under this agreement, Iran agreed to limit its nuclear activities in exchange for significant sanctions relief from the United States, the European Union, and the United Nations. Key provisions included capping uranium enrichment at 3.67%, reducing its stockpile of enriched uranium, and allowing extensive IAEA inspection access to verify compliance.
For a time, the JCPOA eased tensions and slowed Iran’s nuclear progress in areas that might contribute to weaponisation. However, in 2018 the U.S. unilaterally withdrew from the deal under President Donald Trump, calling it insufficient and reimposed stringent economic sanctions. In response, Iran gradually rolled back its JCPOA limitations, increasing enrichment levels, expanding its uranium stockpile, and reducing cooperation with IAEA monitoring.
By the early 2020s, Tehran had enriched uranium to levels far beyond the JCPOA cap, in some cases approaching the 60% purity level, a technical step closer to weapons-grade material. This escalation heightened global concern about the so-called “breakout capability”—the time Iran would need to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon if it chose to do so.
Attempts to restore the nuclear deal or reach a successor framework have faced obstacles. European and U.S. efforts at negotiation have stalled repeatedly, especially in the face of rising regional tensions and mutual distrust. Iran’s official position has sometimes shifted—claiming at times to suspend enrichment and at others resisting full transparency—adding uncertainty to diplomatic efforts.
Moreover, recent geopolitical developments, including military strikes by U.S. and Israeli forces on Iranian nuclear sites and Iran’s subsequent restriction of IAEA access, have complicated the landscape further. The IAEA has repeatedly expressed that it cannot fully verify Iran’s compliance or the size of its enriched uranium stockpile under current conditions, undermining confidence in the programme’s peaceful nature.
Critics argue that a nuclear-armed Iran would destabilise the Middle East, spur regional arms races, and embolden Tehran’s influence in conflicts through allied militias. Meanwhile, Iran insists that its nuclear programme is a sovereign right and essential for its technological and energy aspirations.
In conclusion, the Iran nuclear programme remains a complex and evolving issue at the intersection of non-proliferation, diplomacy, and regional security. Its future will likely depend on renewed diplomatic engagement, enhanced verification mechanisms, and mutual political willingness to bridge deep-seated mistrust between Iran and the international community.